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1. Introduction 
Literally, Neuroimaging gives us deeper insight into the brain’s function. But, what actually 
is its function? The brain is an organ, almost just as our lungs and hearts. The big difference 
is that we can see the imprints of evolutionary progressions in its organization. Although 
the stamp of evolution is clearly imprinted in the genes that govern the functions of all the 
other organs, that stamp is special within the brain: Brain functions that evolved earlier are 
concentrated in more caudal and medial regions of the brain while those that emerged later 
(e.g., neocortex) are concentrated more rostrally and laterally. Thus, although our brain is an 
organ like no other in the body, we should envision the mind as largely the product of this 
bodily organ, although mind is surely not disconnected from other bodily functions. 
Our heart pumps blood to provide all body parts with essential chemicals. The blood 
pumping is the function (or the mechanism) and the delivery of chemicals the goal. 
Likewise, the brain has various intrinsic functions and evolutionary goals (the “what for” 
evolutionary issue, in Dan Dennett’s terms, as contrasted to the scientifically more workable 
“how come” dimensions of brain mechanisms). The brain’s overall function is to process 
external information, as referenced to internal survival issues that are often coded as 
affective states, and the goal is to produce behaviours that sustain existence. Thinking of 
Darwin’s (1859) idea that fitter organisms are better survivors the brain must have evolved 
to adapt the behaviour of its carrier organism to an ever-changing environment, however 
the adaptive behaviours also need to be referenced to internal survival issues. Sensory input 
representing the outer world is processed and forms an important basis for decisions to be 
made, which need to be related to internal survival issues, which in turn form the basis for 
actual behaviour in terms of movement (any form of muscle contraction). Sensory input, 
information processing and motor output, these are the well-accepted major steps of the 
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brain’s function (see Walla, 2011). However, the internal “set-points”—the within brain 
value referencing of behaviour—is often left out of the equation. Here we also seek to bring 
that dimension, as reflected in the affective lives of organisms (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp & 
Biven, 2012), back into the discussion more explicitly, in scientifically testable ways. 
This chapter focuses specifically on the affective side of information processing, especially 
taking into account findings from neuroimaging studies. In addition, the issue is raised that 
the term “emotion” is at times confusingly and interchangeably used between and even 
within disciplines that study the brain and mind, which is itself delaying advances in our 
understanding of the brain. Without conceptual agreement on key terms such as affect, 
emotion and motivation, along with the recognition that each has undergone multi-tiered 
evolutionary progressions, the likelihood of talking past each other increases, as with the 
perennial debates between basic emotion theory and constructivist approaches to similar 
problems (e.g., Lindquist, et al., 2012; Zachar & Ellis, 2012). 
Despite the rather confusing existing terminologies, it must be admitted that neuroimaging 
technologies have shed considerable light on functions underlying emotions. These mainly 
include cognitively preconscious and unconscious aspects (Berlin, 2011), which are not 
easily accessible by questionnaire-based investigations (although they may be mentalized 
with depth-psychoanalytic interviews (see Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000), giving 
neuroimaging technologies one of their most attractive feature. The brain knows (and 
maybe experiences) more than it admits at the cognitive tertiary-process level (Solms & 
Panksepp, 2012), and among the objective tools, only neuroimaging (and startle reflex 
modulation; see Walla et al. 2011) has access to this knowledge. In fact, the advent of 
sophisticated brain imaging methods has facilitated demonstration of the existence of 
various apparently non-conscious brain processes that guide human behaviour within both 
affective and the cognitive domains, even as certain aspects like affective changes often 
reflect brain changes that are not easily measured with fMRI (functional Magnet Resonance 
Imaging) approaches which require precise timing, but can be dramatically envisioned with 
PET (Positron Emission Tomography) scans that are not subject to rigid temporal constrains 
(Damasio, et al., 2000). In any event, there is more to emotion than subjective feelings, with 
many unconscious underpinnings, and it is important to better understand all levels. For 
many issues we simply need to look inside the box that processes all the information, for 
only a fraction of this turns into responses that can be measured via self report. Also, since it 
is well-established that cognitive and affective processes are often in a see-saw balance 
(Liotti & Panksepp, 2004), in fMRI environments that use discrete emotional-cognitive 
stimuli (e.g., facially expressive pictures), it is often best to instruct subjects to experience 
their feelings in the scanner without reporting on their internals states, and then to harvest 
subjective reports after the brain-imaging session is completed; through such procedures, it 
is clear that affective changes are typically directly related more to subcortical arousals, and 
inversely correlated with cortical ones (Northoff, et al., 2009). 
Our goal here is to share relevant research to highlight some of the points already made. 
Besides introducing some of the key findings of various neuroimaging methods and 
proposing a clear and distinct use of the terms “emotion” and “affective processing”, we 
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also entertain clear ways to separate cognitions from affective processing and emotion 
(although a lot of interaction occurs). Mauss and Robinson (2009) finished their abstract by 
concluding that experiential, physiological, and behavioural measures are all relevant to 
understanding emotion and that they cannot be assumed to be interchangeable. We agree 
and add that a full-blown emotion is the result of physiological activity—both of brain and 
body--which we call affective processing, but that affective processing alone does not yet 
qualify for an emotion. In animals, emotions are evident in distinct behavioural displays, 
along with complex changes, in which all relevant components are already organized at 
subcortical levels, along with some form of primal affective states as monitored by the 
rewarding and punishing properties of those circuits (Panksepp, 1998). However, those low 
levels of the brain do not elaborate the many cognitive processes that always accompany 
emotional arousal in humans. The distinction between affective processing and emotion 
shall be the most important basis of the proposed emotion model (see final section of paper). 
Here affect is seen as the raw valenced aspect of emotional arousals, while the concept of 
emotion remains more indeterminated. Although it has traditionally included everything, 
from diverse cognitive, behavioural and autonomic associates to very subtle and diverse 
feeling states, we suspect that it is time to re-simplify this term, so it does not cause as much 
mischief as it has, ever since Darwin brought it to the scientific table. 
2. Further background 
The idea that the primary purpose of the brain is to produce some sort of movement fits the 
notion of the evolutionary process called cephalisation, the creation of a separate specialised 
head enclosing a central brain. As organisms developed limbs for locomotion, their body 
shape also began to change. The body took on a longitudinal forward-facing position and 
the sensory organs began to move to the front and/or develop at the front of the body, 
where first contact with new environmental stimuli would be made. Since a major attribute 
of the brain’s overall functioning is to process sensory input, it seems obvious that having 
sensory organs at the front of the body and the brain close by is a big advantage. Thus, by 
simply observing the stages of evolution it can be said that the movements allowed our 
brain to produce complex action patterns that reflect various within-brain processes, 
including both unconscious and phenomenally experienced ones. It is always hard to 
imagine such major evolutionary steps, but doing so tremendously facilitates our 
understanding of how the brain works. It also affords discourse sufficient complexity to 
reduce the likelihood that investigators working at different evolutionary levels indulge in 
seemingly substantive but often empty controversies.  
An example may help here: In trying to understand both unconscious and phenomenally 
experienced action tendencies, it is critical to recognize that an ancestral urge to move 
forward and approach resources—e.g., a reward SEEKING system—has both unconscious 
and experienced brain functions. This urge was built into the brain early in brain evolution 
(i.e., it is a primary-process) shared in basic form—as “a major brain reward system”--by all 
vertebrates; it is experienced as a diffuse positive enthusiasm to pursue resources (the felt 
component is inferred from the rewarding property of this system, even in the absence of 
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higher brain functions as in decorticate animals), but it is one that has remained linked to 
the emergence and refinement of sophisticated action routines permitted by cephalization 
and hence ever more sophisticated cognitive capacities to guide behaviour (Panksepp, 1998; 
Panksepp & Moskal, 2008). It looks like a series of such fundamental affective systems 
govern the basic “secondary process” learning and memory functions of the brain that, to 
the best of our knowledge, operate totally unconsciously (affective memory). The harvesting 
of memories about the world (semantic and episodic memory) provides opportunities for 
the highest regions of the brain, whose functions are best visualized with modern brain 
imaging—from fMRI to MEG (Magnetoencephalography) procedures—to generate diverse 
higher mental functions, many of which reflect subconscious processing while some appear 
as experienced thoughts within our minds (conscious processing). 
Now, let’s take a closer look at our brain’s function. We will especially focus on the 
processing of external information entering the brain via sensory organs. Put simply, there 
are two major aspects of any sensory input that update our brain with the conditions of the 
world outside in order to adapt behavior. One aspect refers to detailed semantic 
information, i.e. “What is it that I see through my eyes, hear through my ears, or detect with 
any of my other sensory systems?” That aspect reflects the rationale or cognitive domain. 
The other aspect is not detailed at all and refers to rather abstract information, i.e. “Is what I 
see through my eyes, hear through my ears, or detect through any of my other sensory 
systems supporting my life or is it detrimental?” That aspect reflects the affective domain, 
which is pre-cognitive in the sense that internal neuro-affective emotional states intrinsically 
guide action tendencies since they arise from the neural circuitries of instinctual emotional 
action tendencies. By the way, the sense of olfaction might be the modality that first 
delivered the mammalian brain (or maybe even the brains of all vertebrates) with external 
information leading to strong affective processing (see Walla , 2008; Walla & Deecke, 2010). 
In general, affective state processing appears to be more primitive than cognitive 
information processing and might have evolved as a first “evaluation system” guiding 
behavior on the basis of more precise external information processing, slightly above the 
unconscious behaviors that reflect reflexes and other completely automatic processes (e.g., 
cardiac dynamics) that proceed without any obligatory mental contents. 
However, we do not wish to suggest that automatic processes are always unconscious since 
at the foundational level we have “instinctual” systems that are more than reflexive in that 
there are large-scale systems that guide dynamic instinctual behavioral routines that already 
evaluate the environment for conditions that support or detract from survival. They may 
exist without any sophisticated cognitive mind, but may already have developed the 
capacity for affective experiential capacities as a primal way to steer behavior and guide 
learning based on incoming sensory inputs—such arousals feel good and bad in various 
ways, and promote basic learning mechanisms (e.g., operant conditioning; affective 
memory). If certain life events lead to bad sensory feelings such as pain, some of these 
systems promote various escape and avoidance behaviors that reduce those feelings (by 
withdrawal from negative affects). If life events lead to good feelings, there are intrinsic 
systems that are well positioned to increase those feelings (via various approach behaviors). 
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These low-level instinctual-integrative systems are the ones we call intrinsic primary-
processes. Thus, we already have distinct sensory-affects and emotional affects at the very 
foundations of the mind and brain (Panksepp & Biven, 2012; Solms & Panksepp, 2012). 
Further, both of these types of primal affects are modulated by bodily state—e.g., hunger 
and thirst. The way we can determine such affective states of mind in animals is by direct 
evaluation of the rewarding and punishing properties of artificial arousal of emotional 
action systems as with direct electrical deep brain stimulation (DBS) (Panksepp, 1998, 2005). 
The topmost, tertiary-process, levels of our brain’s function can thus be extended to conjoint 
affective and cognitive processing. Panksepp’s Affective Neuroscience (1998) framework 
states that the affective aspects of a stimulus are processed before and independently of any 
cognitive aspects, given their more ancient role in decision-making. This makes sense given 
that key structures engaged in the generation of primal emotions are found to be mainly 
subcortical (see later)—caudo-rostrally areas such as periaqueductal gray, hypothalamus, 
ventral striatum, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, dorsomedial thalamus, septum and 
amygdala, as well as at higher levels in regions such as cingulate cortex, insula, and 
orbitofrontal cortex. Although some have posited that the amygdala lies at the heart of 
affective life (LeDoux, 1996), while others have bestowed a primary role on the insula 
(Craig, 2009), it is quite clear that humans with both of these brain regions completely 
burned out by brain diseases have vibrantly rich affective lives (for most compelling case 
study and relevant literature, see Damasio, et al., 2012).  
In contrast, most explicit cognitive processing is heavily neo-cortical. Additionally, 
subcortical structures are evolutionarily older than cortical structures, meaning that the first 
elements of decision-making must have involved basic affective processing. Thus, older and 
faster are two distinctive features of affective processing versus cognitive processing. This 
has important consequences for the relationship between locomotion and cephalization. 
Moving forward means to continuously face different environments and it is of utmost 
importance to evaluate all new stimuli with respect to their survival value. Much of the 
psychomotor energy for this persistent urge of the nervous system is due to arousal of the 
mesolimbic SEEKING system (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; Alcaro, et al., 2007, 2011; 
Panksepp & Moskal, 2008). At the primary process level (see Panksepp, 2011), it is more 
important to evaluate the survival value of external stimuli as well as internal states than to 
know what they actually are, giving affective information processing a more primary 
survival role than cognitive information processing. Further, affective processing needs to 
be sub-categorized into at least three levels of analysis: sensory affects (such as taste and 
olfaction), homeostatic affects (such as hunger and thirst mediated by bodily interoceptors), 
and emotional affects (the most subtle, and most important for psychiatric issues, which 
seem to arise from the intrinsic affective action schema of the brain). 
3. Subcortical structures process non-conscious affective information 
Most neuroimaging studies find that various subcortical and some cortical structures are 
involved in affective information processing. According to Tracy and Randles (2011), four key 
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investigators in emotion research agree that “basic emotions” arise from activities in subcortical 
structures. In particular, Panksepp and colleagues (see Panksepp & Biven, 2012; Panksepp & 
Watt, 2011) assert that only subcortical structures house genetically determined, fixed emotional 
networks whose activities generate various rewarding and punishing states, while neocortex 
provides the necessary cognitive space to think about them. While all four scholars discussed by 
Tracy and Randles come up with slightly different sets of basic emotions, indicating there are 
still abundant ambiguities in the field, only one of the above is based on rigorous neuroscientific 
analysis of the underlying brain systems with DBS (e.g. Panksepp, 1992). In any event, all agree 
that emotions start with some kind of subcortical processing. 
By far the most frequently noted subcortical structure is the well-known amygdala (one in 
each hemisphere). This structure is the size of a hazelnut and it has become the star in 
affective processing (to cite just a few key investigators: Halgren et al., 1978; LeDoux, 1993; 
Bechara et al., 1995; Adolphs et al., 1995; Calder et al., 1996). Many others also report that 
this structure is critically involved in affective information processing, although it does not 
seem to be essential for experienced affective feelings (Damasio, et al., 2012). While it seems 
obvious that increased activity in the amygdala is important for the learning of fear, it is 
wrong to assume that amygdala activity alone is enough for generating feelings of fear. In 
fact, it is more involved in the learned information processing related to fearful arousals, 
and much of that secondary-processing can be unconscious. In fact, it has been shown that 
amygdala activity as a consequence of visual negatively valenced stimulation occurs and 
changes behaviour even in the absence of conscious visual perception (e.g. Öhman, 2002). 
Morris et al. (1999) nicely demonstrated in an fMRI study that amygdala activity is also 
increased in case of unseen negative emotional information content (not consciously 
perceived visual stimuli). Another team of investigators titled their paper “Affective 
blindsight” (Hamm et al., 2003). They found startle reflex enhancement as a consequence of 
visual fear conditioning in a cortically blind patient. Their data suggest that visual 
subcortical pathways including the amygdala are sufficient to activate negatively valenced 
affective information processing in humans in the total absence of visual awareness. 
From the idea that subcortical structures are the ones that process basic emotion-related 
information it is not far to the idea that affective processing happens outside of cognitive 
awareness. Some investigators have elaborate ideas about “unconscious emotion”. Zajonc 
(2000) addressed the issue of non-conscious (or unconscious) emotions. For instance, in a 
book titled “The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions” (edited by Ekman and 
Davison in 1994) he wrote an essay with the title “Evidence for non-conscious emotion”. In 
2003, Berridge and Winkielman report about evidence supporting the idea of genuinely 
unconscious emotion (particularly unconscious liking). The authors report about their 
findings that despite the absence of detectable subjective shifts in affective experiences, 
subliminally induced unconscious liking can influence concurrent consumption of a 
sweetened drink. After all that, we also believe that much unconscious processing occurs 
related to “emotion”, but what’s unconscious here should be labeled “affective information 
processing” and not “emotion”, because emotion is not information processing, it is the 
output of it as we propose (see final section of this paper). 
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In 2000, Zajonc also proposed in an article provocatively entitled “Closing the debate over the 
independence of affect” that the separation of affective and cognitive neuroscience exists and 
makes sense. This gives Panksepp’s “Affective Neuroscience” (1998) a stand-alone character 
and it might also support the notion to exclude any intrinsic cognitive aspects in an emotion 
definition. Cognition is a separate, parallel function, which of course can and does synergize 
with as well as interfere with affective information processing, but it adds little to see cognition 
as an intrinsic aspect of primary-process emotionality, while at a tertiary-process level, it 
clearly has a role. In any event, affective information processing can and certainly does 
influence cognition. Cognitive influences on affective processing are top-down, whereas 
affective influences on cognition are rather bottom-up. In some neuroimaging studies about 
“emotion” neural structures that have been shown to be involved in some sort of cognition 
have commonly been found to be active (Lindquist, et al., 2012). Unfortunately, such findings 
have been commonly interpreted as “cognitive aspects of emotion” it may be wiser to see them 
as distinct associated processes. It may well be that at some point in information processing, 
perhaps shortly before a decision is made, affective information merges with cognitive 
information. In this combination, both initially separate processes subserve decision-making. 
However, a clear distinction should be made and a clear line drawn. 
4. Emotion through facial expression 
Much of the human basic-emotion literature has focused on emotions elicited through facial 
expressions (e.g. Ekman et al., 1987; Izard, 1971; Tracy & Robins, 2008). There is considerable 
evidence showing that, for instance, a facial expression of disgust elicits brain activity in the 
observer’s brains other than that evoked by a disgusting non-facial picture (Faces versus 
scenes; e.g. Sabatinelli et al., 2011). Unpublished electroencephalography (EEG) data of a 
diploma student supervised by Peter Walla show that pictures of natural scenes of different 
emotional categories elicit larger deviating event-related potentials (ERPs) between emotion 
categories than facial expressions of the same emotion categories. This is the case for early 
(below 200 ms) and for later (200 ms to 800 ms) time windows. 
Narumoto et al. (2001) wrote a paper entitled “Attention to emotion modulates fMRI 
activity in the right superior temporal sulcus (STS). However, it is clear that they scanned 
their study participants while exposing them to facially expressive stimuli. Their finding 
was that the right STS, a structure that they found involved in face processing alone turned 
out to be more active in case of emotion attention. The point here is that a facial expression 
is an emotion of the person the face belongs to. The image of a facial expression is not 
necessarily in itself a matching affective stimulus such as the scene that elicited affect in the 
person demonstrating the facial expression. Again, imagine a disgusting scene versus a 
disgusted face. Let us call the difference “direct versus indirect affective information” (or 
first- and second-hand affective information). It instantly becomes clear that indirect 
affective information as communicated via facial expression can be misinterpreted and 
actually lead to different affective processing and a different emotion in the observer of a 
facial expression. Second-hand affective information is influenced (or biased) by all sorts of 
context-dependent information. For example, an angry facial expression can be the result of 
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true primary-process anger, but it can equally likely be the result of tertiary-process victory 
(“DAMN IT, I WON!”, see figure 1) and would thus be the result of positive affective 
information. It seems that context plays a crucial role in the higher-order perception of 
emotion as in human facial expressions, and much of the existing literature has never 
attempted to ferret out levels of control within the brain or mind that may reflect 
synergistic or distinct affective processes. That failure could have led to enormous and 
persistent controversies in human emotion research, especially when it comes to perennial 
debates between advocates of basic emotion theory, e.g., Paul Ekman and Cal Izard, and 
those who pursue constructivist agendas such as Lisa Feldman Barrett and Jim Russell (for 
a thorough discussion, see Lindquist, et al., 2012, and associated commentaries). On the 
other hand, in scenes context is always present eliciting affective processing and emotions 
more directly. 
  
Figure 1. Left: facial expression alone looks like “anger” or “pain”. Right: with context it turns into a 
quite positive and rewarding emotion communication (Game – Set – Match). iStockphoto. 
5. Affective processing and self-reference 
Self-reference might be critically involved in some specific emotion-related brain processes 
(Northoff et al., 2006; Garrett and Maddoc, 2006). The insular cortex has been suggested to 
be involved in processing self-referential information in a magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
(Walla et al., 2007) and an electroencephalography (EEG) study (Walla et al., 2008). In these 
studies, pairs of possessive pronouns and nouns (e.g. my pencil; his pencil) were used to 
provide controlled independent variables reflecting varying conditions of ownership. These 
were compared with a neutral condition (e.g. a pencil) with no personal reference. Two 
temporal time windows were found to demonstrate interesting effects. In an early time 
window, the investigators found brain activity elicited by both referenced conditions “my 
pencil” and “his pencil” to differ from the unreferenced, neutral condition (a pencil). Figure 
2 shows MEG data reflecting this finding. In a later time window though, “my pencil” 
elicited different brain activity compared to “his pencil”, a clear sign of self-referential 
 
Neuroimaging Helps to Clarify Brain Affective Processing Without Necessarily Clarifying Emotions 101 
information processing (Figure 3). Figure 4 provides localisation results leading to the 
insular cortex hypothesis. 
 
Figure 2. MEG maps. Early neurophysiological effect: MEG maps (magnetic field distributions) 
averaged across depth of word processing and across all study participants for the time interval from 
200 to 300 ms after stimulus onset. First line: one map for each of the three conditions of pronoun (“ein” 
(“a”), “mein” (“my”), “sein” (“his”)). Second line: difference magnetic field distributions related to 
comparisons (subtractions) between each possible pair of pronoun condition (“mein” vs. “ein”, “sein” 
vs. “ein”, “sein” vs. “mein”). Sensor areas where t-tests resulted in significant differences are marked 
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with a white dotted circle. Third line: t-maps showing the distribution of significant differences for each 
of the above-mentioned comparisons (raw data). Note that “mein” vs. “ein” and “sein” vs. “ein” both 
resulted in significant differences, whereas no differences occurred for the comparison “sein” vs. 
“mein”. Fourth line: t-maps showing the distribution of significant differences for each of the above-
mentioned comparisons (amplitude-normalized data). Note that hardly any differences occurred 
(adapted from Walla et al., 2007 with permission). 
 
Figure 3. MEG maps. Later neurophysiological effect: MEG maps (magnetic field distributions) 
averaged across depth of word processing and across all study participants for the time interval from 
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500 to 800 ms after stimulus onset. First line: one map for each of the three conditions of pronoun (“ein” 
(“a”), “mein” (“my”), “sein” (“his”)). Second line: difference magnetic field distributions related to 
comparisons (subtractions) between each possible pair of pronoun condition (“mein” vs. “ein”, “sein” 
vs. “ein”, “sein” vs. “mein”). Sensor areas where t-tests resulted in significant differences are marked 
with a white dotted circle. Third line: t-maps showing the distribution of significant differences for each 
of the above-mentioned comparisons (raw data). Note that “mein” vs. “ein” and “sein” vs. “ein” both 
resulted in significant differences. In addition, the comparison between “sein” and “mein” also resulted 
in significant differences at some of the sensor sites (no such differences were found during the early 
period of time). Fourth line: t-maps showing the distribution of significant differences for each of the 
above-mentioned comparisons (normalized data) (adapted from Walla et al., 2007 with permission).  
 
Figure 4. MEG source localisation results. Source localization for the later time range (500–800 ms): for 
the averaged data set (across 22 participants) the magnetic field distributions related to all three kinds 
of pronoun are displayed for a particular time point within the time window from 500 to 800 ms, which 
was found to include significant differences over left temporal and left fronto-temporal sensors 
depending on the kind of pronoun. The localized dipole in this respective region shows stronger brain 
activity as reflected by dipole strength (nA m) related to both personal pronouns compared to the 
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neutral pronoun (strongest activity in the “mein”(“my”) condition). The location of this dipole is 
interpreted as left temporal. Most likely it is the left insular cortex that is able to discriminate between 
self and other (adapted from Walla et al., 2007 with permission). 
The above-mentioned EEG study by Walla et al. (2008) revealed very supportive similar 
findings. Together with the MEG findings the “multiple aspect theory” of self-awareness was 
created and the insular cortex was suggested to be critical for self-reference processing. In an 
independent EEG study by Herbert et al. (2011a), confirmative date were collected with 
respect to a self-other distinction (Figure 5), and these self-reference findings were even 
extended to the emotion domain. From 350 ms onwards, processing of self-related unpleasant 
words (e.g. my fear) elicited larger frontal negativity compared to unpleasant words that were 
related to the other (e.g. his fear) or that had no reference at all (e.g. the fear). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Main effects of self–other reference. Grand average ERP waveforms at posterior and anterior 
electrodes during reading of self- and other-related pronoun–noun pairs and non-referential article–
noun pairs (adapted from Herbert et al., 2011a with author permission). 
The results of a recent fMRI study by Herbert et al. (2011b) revealed the neural structures 
that mediate self-reference in emotional conditions. The study demonstrates that the 
activity level of the amygdalae and the insular cortex depends on stimulus reference (as 
described below). The authors further conclude that brain structures implicated in 
affective and self-related processing might be crucial prerequisites for a subjective 
experience of emotions. 
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Reading unpleasant words increased activity in the amygdala and the insular cortex 
regardless of self, other or no reference (Figure 6 and 7). This confirms the role of these two 
structures in processing negatively valenced stimuli (negative affective information 
processing). Interestingly, positively valenced nouns preferentially increased amygdala and 
insular cortex activity in case of self-reference compared to other or no reference (Figure 6 
and 7). In addition, pleasant nouns were rated more pleasant in case of self-reference, which 
mirrors underlying neurophysiology on the behavioural level. 
Taken together, the above-mentioned studies highlight that “emotion”-related brain activity 
begins at the subcortical level (section 3.), and that self-reference seems to play a specific role 
for at least some of emotion-related information (section 4.). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Right panel: Mean signal changes (mean and standard errors) in the left and right amygdala 
during processing of emotional and neutral self-related, other-related and unreferenced nouns. The 
picture on the left (left panel) displays significant changes in the amygdala during processing of self-
related emotional nouns, p < 0.005. Color bars represent T-values. (adapted from Herbert et al., 2011b 
with permission). 
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Figure 7. Right panel: Mean signal changes (mean and standard errors) in the left and right insula 
during processing of emotional and neutral self-related, other-related and unreferenced nouns. The 
picture on the left (left panel) displays significant changes in the insula during processing of self-related 
emotional nouns, p < 0.005. Color bars represent T-values. (adapted from Herbert et al. (2011b) with 
permission). 
6. Problems and inconsistencies 
Because of the many levels of control of all emotion-related processes within the neuroaxis, 
scholars from different disciplines discussing emotion issues easily misinterpret what others 
say. Some feel that emotions arise from higher brain regions where cognitions and affects 
intermingle; some think that discussions of emotions in animals must be constrained to the 
behavioral level only (LeDoux, 1996, 2012); yet others think that emotions are 
epiphenomena and can have no causal influence on the control of behavior. The view of too 
many behavioral neuroscientists - that there is no possibility of a sound science of 
experienced affective processing (feeling) - avoid the most robust evidence against their 
beliefs: Almost everywhere in the brain emotional behavior can be induced with DBS and 
can serve as “rewards” and “punishments” in the control of behavior. If behaviorist skeptics 
wish to have it their way, their responsibility is to list the diverse “rewards” and 
“punishments” which control human behavior that are not experienced in our species. In 
our experience, none have yet to be put forward. And from this vantage, experienced 
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affective processing (feeling) has to be defined as much in neural terms as in 
psychological/verbal ones—for the confusion exists primarily at the later level.  
If one is after a definition of emotion it turns out that almost as many definitions exist as 
textbooks are available. Just as some scholars would call the engine of a car “car”, while 
others would call driving a hunk of sculpted metal a “car” without realizing that the engine 
is essential for driving, but it actually is a separate thing deserving its own label. 
Additionally, many original articles in emotion research report about emotions elicited in 
observers after presentations of facial expressions. Does a facial expression really elicit the 
same emotion-related activity in the observer’s brain as the one that caused the facial 
expression in the person the face belongs to? It seems that the answer is, no it doesn’t (see 
Sabatinelli et al., 2011; Britton et al., 2005, 2006). Looking at 157 neuroimaging studies, 
Sabatinelli found that only the amygdala demonstrated consistent activity independent 
from stimulus category (face or scene). Ideally, the science community needs a more specific 
definition of emotion in order to make consistent progress and to promote research 
communication within and across disciplines. 
In the frame of this chapter we tried to consistently use the terms “affective information” 
and “emotion”. In the original articles these terms were used interchangeably and even 
mixed with further terms including cognitive aspects. As mentioned in the introduction, we 
want to generate awareness about the inconsistent and broad use in particular of the term 
emotion. Feeling the urge to do something about this is not new. We are not the first to 
address this issue and we are certainly not alone. In 1981, Kleinginna and Kleinginna 
created awareness about the wide variety of approaches to labeling emotion by providing a 
list of no less than 92 emotion definitions. They classified these definitions into 11 categories 
depending on their theoretical basis. Some of these categories are based on subjective 
aspects of emotion (affective and cognitive), others on external stimuli, or on physiological 
mechanisms. Some are based on expressive behavior, on functional consequences or on 
disruptive or adaptive effects. Others are based on the multi-aspect nature of emotional 
phenomena and some distinguish emotion from other processes or emphasize the overlap 
between emotion and motivation. Finally, the authors found some statements that question 
the usefulness of the entire “emotion” concept. No doubt, the variety is big. Kleinginna and 
Kleinginna also stated that more recent definitions are as inconsistent as the earlier ones. 
This reflects the state of research up to the year 1981. 
In 1995, LeDoux emphasized in the abstract of a paper entitled “Emotion: Clues from the 
Brain” that scientists at that time have not been able to reach a consensus about what 
emotion is and what place emotion should have in a theory of mind and behavior. Some 
emotions were considered more basic than others. To what extent do emotional responses 
contribute to emotional experiences? What can we say about interactions between cognition 
and emotion and finally how important are conscious versus unconscious processes in 
emotion research. A few years later, Cabanac (2002) mentioned that there is still no 
consensus in the literature on a definition of emotion and even today, a decade later, not 
much progress has been made. Perhaps, due to the appealing possibilities of neuroimaging 
methods researchers were spoiled by eye-catching colored brain images that looked nice 
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and were easy to sell, but after all they neglected to make progress in terms of identifying a 
better concept of emotion and providing a more specific evidence-based definition. Fed by 
multi-used terms for brain functions that occur from sensory input to actual behavior, 
ongoing research is obviously not focused on clarifying terminological issues around 
“emotion”, so semantic confusions prevail. To date, we still lack a useful definition and a 
distinct and common terminology of related functions.  
However, we would suggest that a nested hierarchical view of both brain and mind may go 
a long way toward clarity, in that discourse in the area, especially as related to human 
emotions, has been primarily at what we call the tertiary process level. If we consider that 
primary-process analysis, best pursued in animal models (Panksepp, 1998, 2011a,b), 
provides the most robust evidence for cross-mammalian genetically-ingrained 
infrastructures for emotionality, not only in terms of behavior but raw phenomenally 
significant affective experiences, we may need to cultivate new ways to discuss the full 
complexity of the brain and mind (Solms & Panksepp, 2012). The single fact that highlights 
the affective phenomenology that arises from these ancient circuits is the simple fact that 
wherever in the brain investigators have evoked, with deep brain stimulation, coherent 
instinctual expressions of emotional behaviors, those central states always serve as rewards 
and punishments in the control of simple learned approach and escape behaviors (even in 
the absence of neocortex). Since all major “rewards” and “punishments” that control human 
behavior are also experienced affectively, we have no good reasons to conclude, other than 
pervasive biases promoted by long-standing beliefs, that the primitive subcortical 
foundations of emotional integrations that are experienced as affects cannot be cognitively 
interpreted by our brains. We think they can, but this requires a new marriage between 
animal and human research, where one recognizes how powerfully cognitive aspects of 
mind can influence affective functions and vice versa. How those findings relate to the 
abundant correlative data from human brain imaging is an open issue (Lindquist et al., 
2012), but one needs to conceptualize and evaluate the cognitive and affective issues 
independently for the reciprocal interactions can be huge (Liotti and Panksepp, 2004; 
Northoff, et al., 2009). 
An informative review paper by Phan et al. (2002) summarizing 55 Neuroimaging studies 
(Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and functional Magnet Resonance Imaging (fMRI)) 
nicely demonstrates that authors label “emotion” almost anything that happens in the brain 
without discriminating between affective processing, actual subjective experiences and other 
aspects (Figure 8). Phan et al. stated as one of the inclusion criteria that only studies about 
“higher-order mental processes of emotion” were entered in their analysis, while excluding 
lower-order processes including “sensory or motor processes, such as gustatory/olfactory or 
pain induction”. This distinction together with the wide distribution of relevant brain areas 
highlights that emotion-related brain processing does have many aspects, but many traditional 
distinctions do not really help to better understand them nor do they help to better define 
emotion. In fact, many facets of the current debate about the nature of emotions continue to 
contribute to the many confusions that have long characterized this field (for a many 
examples, and suggested solutions, see Lindquist, et al., 2012). 
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Figure 8. Phan et al. (2002) study: Overlay of neuroimaging findings from emotion studies showing 
emotion-relevant brain areas. (A) Activation foci: Individual emotion. (B) Activation foci: Induction 
method. (C) Activation foci: Cognitive demand. Adapted from Phan et al. (2002) with permission. 
Too many chefs spoil the soup and too many scholars from different disciplines spoil the 
definition of emotion. For cognition, the sibling of affective information processing (both 
system are meant to support behaviour adaptation), you can say that it basically means 
“thinking”, but breaking emotion down to a single term seems to be a rather difficult 
challenge. The reason for that is because emotion is the output and not the processing. If you 
place affective information processing on the level of cognitive information processing you 
could say that affective processing means “evaluating”. In this chapter, it is suggested that 
the term emotion be reserved for only the behavioral aspects of it. After all, the Latin word 
emotion means to move out. It is about movement and movement equals behavior (in terms 
of neurobiology). The alternative is that emotion be simply seen as a class-identifier—an 
umbrella concept—that includes all the major aspects that are traditionally subsumed by 
this concept, namely the behavioral, autonomic-physiological, neural, cognitive and 
affective attributes. The reason we suggest the more minimalist solution is that the broader 
concept has led to so much trouble already, and at this stage of history we find many people 
talking past each other (as is well summarized in Lindquist, et al., 2012). 
This would allow the experiential issues to be discussed more cogently without the excess 
historical baggage that now clutters the field and continually impedes clear discourse. If we 
were to reserve the term “emotion” to the visually evident behavioral displays, and 
discussed affective states independently at several distinct levels—e.g., the primal affective-
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experiential level, the secondary-process learning level, and the tertiary-process thoughtful 
cognitive level, we may be able to disentangle the conceptual Gordian Knot that is the major 
current historical dilemma of the field. If we do this, we can envision the study of affect 
related cognitive information-processing to highlight many of the unique properties of the 
affective life in humans, and the many ancestral affective value schemata apparently shared 
homologously in all mammals (maybe even all vertebrates) to provide a level of 
fundamental psychological analysis that is best pursued constitutionally and causally in 
animal models of emotionality. This would still leave the many important autonomic-
visceral arousals that accompany emotions as a field that can be equally illuminated by 
human and animal research. Such an approach would also allow for several different affects 
and perhaps emotions to occur simultaneously as a result of one set of external stimuli, 
affective stimuli. 
7. The proposed Emotion-Model 
The proposed Emotion-Model (figure 9) follows the idea that simpler schemes are better 
than complex ones, especially in the early phases of investigation, where we still are despite 
thousands of published papers. Our model gives the ambiguous term “emotion” a distinct 
place (and meaning) rather than using it interchangeably for various different processes that 
should all have their own separate labels. We were inspired by numerous neuroimaging 
studies (e.g. especially Damasio et al., 2000), which mainly demonstrated the engagement of 
subcortical structures in processing of affectively experienced states. We follow Panksepp’s 
idea that “emotions” have their behavioural-action roots deep in the brain, and they also 
generate raw feelings, and label the roots “affective processing”. We also accept that the 
lower levels of processing are strongly influenced by higher brain functions which are most 
effectively studied in humans (e.g, Liotti & Panksepp, 2004; Northoff, et al., 2006; Lindquist, 
et al., 2012). Because the foundational structures for emotionality are old in evolutionary 
terms and because it is often claimed that conscious experiences rely on cortical structures, 
we believe that “emotions”, as behaviors, all have an unconscious origin, while at the same 
time, through some kind of poorly understood emergent “field dynamics” those emotion-
related systems provide a foundation for the origin of raw affective feelings. Their origin is 
ultimately rooted in primal affective action routines as well as higher affective information 
processing. Still, the first level of affective information processing, as reflected in basic 
mechanisms of learning and memory is unconscious by nature. It does not always promote 
emotional displays, while still processing stimulus-related life supportive or detrimental 
aspects. In other words, the intermediate secondary-process level that lies between our 
lower and higher psychological functions may help parse action patterns in space and time, 
and thereby provide more discrete pieces of information for higher brain processing. Many 
human emotions are possible consequences of such unconscious processing of affective 
states into more discrete components that are discrete motor expressions in one way or 
another. They occur in humans and certainly in various other nonhuman mammals. It may 
even be that such affective processing without creating any new emotional reactions occurs 
in some if not all lower vertebrates. In humans, such intermediate levels of affective 
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processing provide enormous amounts of new information that is grist for thought, as well 
as the generation of enormous affective and emotional nuances. 
The behavioural aspects of emotions (or expressive aspects) were highlighted by several 
authors. Even Darwin focussed on the expressive nature of an emotion rather than anything 
else, although he never denied the affective power of emotions. We now know more about 
the underlying processes that lead to an emotion, and what we can derive from the evidence 
is that not all affective processes (especially sensory and homeostatic ones) necessarily lead 
to emotion responses, although they guide our behaviour on the basis of evaluating life 
supportive or detrimental aspects of information representing the outer world. If these 
processes do not lead to emotions and also not to feelings, which are experienced affective 
processes they remain non-conscious and are thus a type of incidental encoding, which we 
call here incidental affective encoding. 
 
Figure 9. The proposed emotion model. Emotions are consequences of raw affective processing. They 
can be modified by information of higher order processes. Thus, raw affective information is able to 
elicit more than just one emotion, while these multiple emotions can even be differently valenced. 
However, affective processing also occurs in the absence of emotion generation. Finally, emotions are 
principally independent from cognition. Adapted from Solms and Panksepp (2012). 
To summarise the proposed Emotion-Model, an emotion is always caused by implicit 
affective information processing. Even emotional displays in humans are thus the result of 
affective information processing. Affective information processing in humans typically 
evaluates the world outside and only sometimes, when certain intrinsic types of within-
brain action readiness schema are aroused, create both emotional responses and emotional 
feelings. It may well be that the crucial factor for creating an emotion and/or a feeling as a 
result of affective processing is deep “self reference” as it may occur in brain regions as deep 
as the PAG (Panksepp, 1998) as well as higher order “self reference” as it may occur in the 
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insular cortex (Walla et al., 2007; Herbert et al., 2011b) and various medial cortical zones 
(Northoff, et al., 2006).  
“Emotion” research is a field with wide implications. Basic researchers, clinicians, product 
developers and also advertisers and marketers – they all deal with emotion, yet they don’t 
seem to bother too much about the fact that one term – emotion – is in use to explain a 
whole complex chain of brain processes and perhaps different functions and/or sub-
functions. The present multi-tiered evolutionary model that we propose here may help to 
guide scientific inquiries and explain scientific findings in more coherent, and hopefully 
understandable ways. It must be noted that most other animals do not have such massive 
higher reflections of cognitively experienced affective processing, so in them instinctual 
emotional behaviours may veridically reflect corresponding affective states (Panksepp, 1998, 
2011a,b). Thus, animal research may help illuminate the subcortical emotional and affective 
infrastructures of human minds that are comparatively inaccessible through human 
research. An example of how this may promote understanding of human emotional 
responses is currently well-represented in the emerging field of neuroeconomics (Knutson & 
Greer, 2008) as well as consumer neuroscience, where intuition, or in other words the well 
known “gut-feelings”, are in discussion as implicit affective processes, perhaps merged with 
non-conscious cognitions. For instance, startle reflex modulation is considered to be a 
methodological approach that allows to quantify affective information processing in the 
human brain (e.g. Walla et al., 2010; Walla et al., 2011; Geiser et al., 2011; Grahl et al., 2012). 
Our final statement relates to the idea that affective information processing is adaptive and 
supports the fitness of an organism as usually seen from an evolutionary perspective (see 
Gross, J.J., 1999). We believe that at least in humans this is not always the case, since the 
primary-process subcortical networks for affective processing emerged long before the 
human neocortex, which permits self-reflective thoughtfulness about ones affective feelings. 
It may well be that affective information processing and emotions do play an adaptive role, 
but obviously they can be life threatening as in cases of severe depression. Depressions are 
assumed to have affective origins, closely related to various primary-process affective 
systems (Coenen, et al., 2011; Panksepp & Watt, 2011). They can cause enormous life 
problems if not adequately dealt with. Perhaps, this issue often does not relate to affective 
processing alone, but often occurs as a result of affective processing associated with 
“internal information” such as information stored in episodic memory, which can lead to 
ruminative dwelling on one’s emotional problems.  
If so, psychotherapy without concurrent use of optimal medications may not be as effective 
as with the use of affectively appropriate medications, which can now be developed through 
the use of animal models that respect and study the emotion related feelings of other 
animals (e.g., Burgdorf, et al., 2011; Panksepp, 2012). Indeed, if the "primary affective 
processing" substrates have been sensitized (e.g., elevated responsivity of the FEAR system 
in chronic anxiety and PTSD), then pharmacological somatic approaches may need to be 
implemented promptly to alleviate distress. Since such circuit changes are not easily 
monitored in individual clients, it may be judicious to assume such changes may have 
transpired in the underlying primal emotional substrates, and evaluate whether modest 
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doses of appropriate medications can facilitate psychotherapeutic interventions. The 
Emotion-Model as proposed here does not yet include a full discussion of optimal 
psychotherapeutic aspects. However, the stratified emotion model we have been working 
with (Figure 9) highlights how higher and lower aspects of affective information processing 
may need to be envisioned for the generation of a comprehensive model (for further 
development of this nested-hierarchical model, see Northoff, et al., 2011; Panksepp, 2011). 
We simply offer this chapter as an introductory start. The model will be further developed 
and future investigations will show whether the suggested hierarchical structure can 
accommodate the fuller complexity of human affective information processing, its 
accompanying affective states and accompanying emotional responses. 
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